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ABSTRACT
The concept of mission assurance was developed so that technical, implementation, and management practices could
be enabled to increase mission success of otherwise irrecoverable spacecraft. Understanding and implementing the
mission assurance trade space for small satellites is important to improve success rates, tackle more challenging
missions while managing expectations, scope missions, and minimize oversight burden that inhibits innovation.
Small satellites generally selectively pick and choose, or completely ignore, the majority of the activities defined in
Class A-D because constraints are an equally driving force and strongly compete with mission objectives. Further,
government funded small satellite missions almost always fall under Class D, but they often create some tailored
assurance profile that generally does not meet the intent of Class D, nor does Class D suffice for the realities of most
small satellite missions.
This paper organizes assurance profiles into a structure that better represents the current status by accounting for the
constraint – mission objective trade space of small satellites. The new infrastructure focuses on studied and
implemented practices that produce successful missions. These practices include: a well-defined scope that balances
constraints and objectives, significant time dedicated to testing at all levels, and lessons-learned-design principles.
WHY
A
NEW
DEFINITION?

MISSION

programmatic challenges (i.e. the cost of launch) or
cultural challenges (i.e. space systems are scoped
around large platforms).

ASSURANCE

Mission Assurance is a mature field for the space
enterprise. The satellite community has invested
heavily in understanding what constitutes ensuring
mission success on-orbit, which has enabled
unparalleled capabilities in space. Standards for parts
traceability, environmental testing, and other practices
and processes have been well researched and
incorporated into the aerospace industrial base (e.g.
Class A-D systems). This has resulted in operational
systems lasting well beyond their required design life in
many cases. These have also caused the perception that
space systems should always work.

Contradictory expectations have emerged where there is
a need for more capability in cheaper and faster
timelines. There exists an underlying assumption that
has evolved over the last number of decades that these
systems cannot fail. While space systems are generally
high reliability, failures have happened either due to
launch or spacecraft issues (Figure 1). The last several
decades of space systems have been in the range of
90% success rate (mission owner accepted outcome
without considering it as a failure). With the advent of
small satellites, missions have been approached with a
much greater dynamic range of assurance practices and
definition of success (often with success as simply
being communications). It is often assumed that higher
assurance practices yield higher mission success rates.
Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that one product of accepting
a wider variety of risk profiles might also be greater
variation in mission success. Still, there is no direct
correlation between higher risk and higher failure rate,
nor does this explicitly show how mission risk profile
(and associated assurance practices) relate to mission

The emerging challenge over the last 10 years has been
the tension between needing/wanting more from fielded
technology at reduced costs, compounded with the
expectation of more rapid technology refresh timelines.
Terrestrially, this is a well understood phenomenon
enabled by effects such as Moore’s Law and manifested
in cyclic product releases such as smartphone release
schedules. In space, these effects are slowed because of
factors such as technical challenges (i.e. radiation),
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success/failure. This paper posits that the use, and
potential acceptance, of this greater dynamic range
allows for systems to increase mission and
technology capability at reduced timelines and cost.

Not all small satellites need follow the constraint driven
model, but instead follow the requirements-driven
model. This paper focuses on the constraint approach.

Figure 1: Percentage of Vehicle1-5 and Launcher6 Success (DOA = dead on arrival)
Small satellites have pushed major development in the
philosophy and implementation of mission assurance.
Originally the focus in small satellite assurance was on
simply ignoring the standards all together or tailoring
from traditional core standards such as MIL-HDBK3437 (now cancelled). In order to make small satellites
relevant and useful as more than just educational tools,
a balance must be struck between doing nothing and
traditional standards.

utilization. Intricately tied into this is a relaxing of
traditional mission assurance methods.
Understanding how to better define the relaxation of
traditional mission assurance is at the core of defining a
new mission assurance paradigm. Cost and schedule are
often the key driving factors; however, understanding
what technical practices and processes should be
leveraged in these riskier categories is important, along
with implementation of a reduced approval authority
structure. Having criteria for the classes enables
programs to understand the risk posture for a program
clearly and allows program managers to bound proper
expectations for leadership and stakeholders. This is
critical to helping prevent leadership from wanting a
low risk (i.e. higher dollar, longer schedule, etc.)
program, with the lower funding profile (and shorter
schedule, etc.) of a high risk mission.

It is becoming clear that programmatic constraints,
combined with technical requirements, must be
considered together to fully embrace the dynamic
assurance/success range available to programs today.
Small satellites take advantage of standardized launch,
re-usable components (i.e. “commoditized” avionics),
and aggressively scoping programs to fit within
constraints allowing for better cost and schedule
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While many programs have expressed the desire to take
advantage of the increased dynamic range, they lack
either the technical knowledge or the programmatic
authority, even though driving policy such as U.S.
national priorities and the Space Enterprise Vision8
encourage increasing capabilities at a faster pace. This

paper attempts to define the present state of small
satellite mission assurance, which does not conform to
the old Class A-D paradigm (Figure 2), so that technical
and programmatic practices can be more clearly
understood.

Figure 2: High-level concept for how new classes augment the existing mission assurance architecture
definition) keep their objective/requirements as-is and
continue to design/refine technology until those
objectives are met. In the constraint driven model,
objectives/requirements are more fluid and need to
bend much more as the true capability of, and
constraints on, the system is understood. In essence, a
constraint-driven mission fits within the capability
“box”, whereas an objective/requirements driven
mission has a “box” made for it. A balance must be
struck between stakeholders and engineers which
recognizes bias towards constraint-driven scoping and
holds to that posture once agreed upon. Without this,
success is substantially harder and scope creep can
drive up resource utilization without significant
increase to the return of the mission. (In spacecraft like
this, it can take time to understand the constraint space
and sometimes re-scoping/reducing mission objectives
is necessary to produce a more tangible mission given
other constraints; this is a healthy and common
outcome to keep within defined limitations.)

The SmallSat Gap: Non-Class A-D Missions
There is significant definition and literature on mission
classification at NASA9, the DOD7, and across the
aerospace industry10. As described in NPR 8705.4, the
risk classification level should be defined and agreed
upon by various parties. Class D has consistently been
the bin into which small satellites have been placed.
This has been done because Class D has elements that
have technical risks that are medium by design and
many credible mission failure mechanisms may exist11.
It has constantly been shown that multiple requirements
of Class D do not match the needs of many small
satellites because they are too restrictive and do not
allow mission-by-mission variability. Small satellites
often ignore the majority of the activities defined in
Class A-D because constraints are an equally driving
force and strongly compete with mission objectives.
With the state-of-the-art in the small satellite industry
and funding these missions receive, small satellite
producers often create tailored assurance profiles. The
tailored profiles do not meet the intent of Class D, nor
does Class D suffice for the realities of most small
satellite missions.

Second, good engineering is not replaced by mission
assurance. Often, good engineering practice is
contained within many MA practices, but here MA is
seen as a check-and-balance to the engineering process.
Further, all missions are designed for full mission
success; the amount of mission assurance can
provide a level of confidence in mission success. If a
mission is not designed for full mission success, either
the design is flawed or the scope is poorly formed.
Conversely, a mission may have high fidelity design
and proceed through well accepted engineering
processes (i.e. the system engineering “V”), however
the mission assurance profile may still follow low
assurance. It should be emphasized that this does not
mean the mission will not fully succeed, but that
confidence in performance to achieve success is less
characterized.

DEFINITION OF A NEW SMALL SATELLITE
MISSION ASSURANCE PHILOSOPHY
There are two key concepts that are essential to the new
framework. First, and somewhat independent from
mission assurance (MA), proper scoping of small
satellite missions is fundamental to successful small
satellites3. This has been expressed by a concept
familiar to the small satellite community: constraint
versus
objective/requirement
driven
missions.
Requirements driven missions (in a puritanical
Jasper
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Figure 3 shows the proposed constraint driven branch
for mission assurance. There are three major constraints

considered in this new architecture and they are
discussed in greater detail below.

Figure 3: Architecture of constraint driven mission assurance
Approval
Authority
Implementation

and

an honest conversation about whether the mission is
requirements or constraint driven and understand
the trade space the program is to operate within.

Programmatic

Programmatic constraints (Figure 3) are often the most
driving for many small satellite missions because they
are expected to be relatively fast and cheap.
Independent of expectations, the reality is that lower
cost and shorter schedule programs often drive the
mission assurance profile lower, i.e. to less
characterized system performance. As programmatic
constraints relax, more assurance practices can be
implemented. A program’s approval authority (AA) is
considered the convening body that accepts/rejects
risks, passes/fails a program at reviews, etc. Conversely
to programmatic constraints, as a program’s AA moves
up an organization’s structure, this often drives mission
assurance higher. While technical practices might not
improve, oversight and the amount of review does
increase. Finally, the technical implementation can
drive mission assurance both higher and lower. Should
there be little new technology, higher state of
integration, or lower system complexity, technical
assurance may not need to be as rigorous, especially to
counter balance any AA or programmatic constraints.
However, challenging designs and missions can push
some practices to being more rigorous.

The following section focuses on technical
implementation but ties some programmatic and
approval constraints into a potential taxonomy for small
satellites.
Technical Implementation
Currently, small satellite mission assurance practices
seem to fall into four major categories as shown in
Table 1. These categories consider the demonstrated
level of functionality (i.e. mission assurance) increasing
in scope from “Do No Harm” up to Full Success. While
this is far from a true specification for how mission
assurance should be performed, Table 1 seems to
represent the present state of the industry and provides
a framework for describing small satellites' assurance
practices.
The taxonomy presented in Table 1 provides a means to
discuss assurance based upon demonstrated capability
with engineers and stakeholders. Using the level of
demonstrated capability teams can provide a level of
confidence, and credibility, for where designs are well
vetted, and where they have had less characterization
i.e. the demonstrated level-of-integration risk
assessment.

Upon
program/mission
inception,
the
stakeholders/leadership and designers should have
Table 1: Small satellites' Program Risk Taxonomy with some example design and test practices
Demonstrated Level
of Capability
Do No Harm

Jasper

Implication

Example Practices

DOA is ok (education and/or fully
constrained and not requirement driven)

Vibration testing, bake out, inhibit design review/test, range safety
measures demonstrated, no RF transmission within 45 minutes of
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Demonstrated Level
of Capability

Implication

Example Practices
deployment/no attitude maneuvers within 15 minutes, 25 year
deorbit. Reviews: informal peer, launch readiness. Approval
Authority (AA): Program

Survival

Not DOA (power + low-rate comm).
May have no higher level functionality

(All of the above), possibly designing power/comm for tumble,
long range communications testing with ground station has been
completed(1), complete charge/discharge cycle testing
completed(2), TVAC. Reviews: informal peer, may have
stakeholder. AA: Program

Minimum
Functionality

Min. Mission Success. Mission
Recoverable in event of fault:
Ex: LEOPS/start up
Ex: Maintain Formation

(All of the above), full command execution test(3), startup/POR
DitL testing(4), Sun-point test(5), other mission specific tests
demonstrating survival functionality, mission specific FTA &
Self-EMC test, thermal analysis. Reviews: informal-SCR, PDR,
CDR, TRR, LRR. AA: Prog. +1 level

Nominal (payload
performance driven
by constraints)

Full Mission Success. Full Functionality

(All of the above), environmental characterization and flow down
into requirements (i.e. radiation), full functional and limited
performance testing, more detailed FTA & FMEA (flight, ground,
GSE), SPF analysis/redundancy, requirement development to at
least L2 and V&V. Reviews: formal-SCR, PDR, CDR, TRR,
LRR. AA: Prog. +2 level

Nominal (payload
performance driven
by requirements)

Full Mission Success. Full Functionality

(All of the above), full functional and performance testing, Worst
Case Analyses & design. NPR 8705.4, TOR-2011(8591)-21

Because each mission has its own challenges, the
practices described in Table 1 are examples (driven by
previous experience) but are not ubiquitous. Part of
constraint-driven mission assurance has been to allow a
building block application of the various practices
(defined by References 9 and 10) as is most critical to
reduce risk on a given mission. An example of this
approach is a high power mission might focus on power
and thermal parts derating, worst case analyses, etc., but
focus less on vehicle FMECA, FTA, requirements
validation, etc. Another example to move faster and
incur less expense is to show more detailed systematic
capability but not subsystem/component.

all small satellites do), and therefore can communicate
with the ground. This assurance posture does not focus
on gaining confidence in whether the mission will
complete but it does focus more on ensuring the vehicle
will make it to orbit alive and is robust enough to
survive unexpected and off-nominal cases. Essentially,
“if the vehicle is alive, there is hope.” Mission
assurance practices focus more on ensuring the
telecommunications and power systems are robust and
that basic functionality of the main computer/software
can support this. Review and oversight may include
more stakeholder/customer interaction; however,
overall go/no-go authority still resides with the
program.

In Table 1 the lowest assurance in the taxonomy is “Do
No Harm”. This is, at its core, not concerned with the
direct functionality of the vehicle and therefore dead on
arrival (DOA) is possible and may be acceptable
relative to assuring the mission succeeds, and NOT
the quality of the engineering behind the design.
Programs here focus on ensuring the small satellite does
not harm the primary spacecraft, the other secondary
spacecraft on the launch vehicle, and deorbits on time.
This includes demonstrating proper power inhibit
architecture, as well as bake-out testing and vibration
testing. Review and oversight is left to the team or local
program control even if funding is provided from
outside.

The following level transitions to improving confidence
that the minimum mission is achieved. Again, the
“minimum mission” definition is a scoping exercise,
but if done well, very clear criteria can be made.
Therefore, this style of mission assurance profile can be
properly built. Here, not only does the mission do no
harm and survive, but the design is demonstrated to
have a recoverable mission even in off-nominal
situations. This can require a significant amount of
design and mission assurance applied in some cases,
e.g. a formation where drift is a driver for the mission.
Recovery time may need to be low to recover the
formation, therefore assurance practices are leveraged
to reduce failure modes and minimize outage. This
level rolls in more design and testing practices from the
traditional A-D classes as well as best practices
(discussed below in the Best Practices section and in

The next level in the taxonomy focuses on gaining
confidence that the vehicle is capable of surviving some
or all vehicle configurations, including tumble (which
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Reference 3). Review and oversight starts to include
more traditional review structures, albeit in an informal
manner with authority to proceed not necessarily
dictated by some/all the traditional reviews. Authority
for the mission comes not from the direct program
office but the next level higher.
Next, mission assurance practices are followed that
provide confidence that the mission may meet full
mission success. It should be emphasized that this is
still a constraint driven (fitting in the box) architecture,
therefore the mission assurance practices are also
constraint driven. It is quite possible that this style of
mission spends significant time in testing for full
functional and performance testing of the payload(s)
and vehicle instead of utilizing more analysis, higher
reliability, etc. to demonstrate that the mission has a
higher probability of full success. Review and oversight
includes formal reviews (that can be tailored to the
specific mission’s needs) as key decision
points/authority to proceed and these judgements are
provided at the next higher level of the overall
organization.
Beyond this point, the standard Class D - A profiles
exist and are the transition point to capability driven
missions. (For comparison Table 2 shows the Class D
definition and how the new taxonomy generally is
different.)
Table 2: SMA Related Requirements for NASA
Class D9 Related to New Taxonomy

Class D
Center Parts
Management Plan

New Taxonomy
acceptable pending
lifetime-robustnessreliability risk trade

Reviews

Center level reviews with
participation of all
applicable directorates.
May be delegated to
Projects. Peer reviews of
software requirements
and code

As defined by
mission profile.
PDR, CDR, PSR are
common reviews.
Peer reviews are
encouraged for all
elements

Safety

Per all applicable NASA
safety directives and
standards

As defined by
Program's
organization
(NASA, AFRL,
university, etc.)

Materials

Requirements are based
on applicable safety
standards. Materials
should be assessed for
application and life limits

As defined by
Program's
organization and
application. Meet
Do No Harm

Reliability
NPD 8720.1

Analysis requirements
based on applicable
safety requirements.
Analysis of interface

As defined by
Program's
organization. There
may be no specific
reliability
requirements

Fault Tree

Fault tree analysis
required for safety
critical functions

Often informal,
conducted for ``do
no harm''
requirements, or
only key elements

PRA (NPR
8705.5)

Safety only. Other
discretionary
applications

Not conducted /
customer specific

Maintainability
NPD 8720.1

Requirements based on
applicable safety
standards

As defined by
Program's
organization. There
may be no specific
requirements

Class D

New Taxonomy

Critical SPFs (for Level
1 requirements) may be
permitted but are
mitigated by use of high
reliability parts,
additional testing, or by
other means. Single
string and selectively
redundant design
approaches may be used

Critical SPFs are
permitted and may
be accepted or
mitigated by use of
high reliability
parts, additional
testing, selective
redundancy,
design robustness,
or by other means.

Quality
Assurance
NPD 8730.5,
8735.2

As defined by
Program's
organization. There
may be no specific
requirements

Limited engineering
model and flight spare
hardware

Pending identified
risks and risk
profile, may utilize
prototypes,
engineering models,
and limited flight
spare hardware

Closed-loop problem
reporting and corrective
action, configuration
management, GIDEP
failure experience data
and NASA Advisory
process. Other
requirements based on
applicable safety
standards

Software

Formal project software
assurance insight

Often utilizes
present-day
software coding best
practices and opensource development

Qual/Test
Program

Testing required only for
verification of safety
compliance and interface
compatibility.
Acceptance test program
for critical performance
parameters

Testing required for
verification of
safety and interfaces
but may expand all
the way to full
performance

Risk
Management
NPR 8000.4

Risk Management
Program. Risk reporting
to GPMC

EEE Parts

Class A, Class B, or
Class C requirements,
and/or requirements per

Industrial COTS
components through
rad-hard parts

Conducted for
mission as integral
part of constraint
definition but may
not follow NPR
8000.4. Lower level
risks tracked
informally or by
Program's

Single Point
Failure

EM, FM, etc.
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Class D
Telem.
Coverage for
critical events

During all mission
critical events to assure
data is available for
critical anomaly
investigations to prevent
future recurrence

along with it the confidence that the mission would
have succeeded to the same level indicated in Figure 1
or Figure 2. In the constraint driven construct, the small
satellite mission team has taken advantage of the ability
to identify the minimum level of activity needed to
increase confidence and meet expectations in achieving
varying degrees of spacecraft functionality below full
mission success. In contrast, Classes A-D assume that
nothing less than full mission success and functionality
are acceptable.

New Taxonomy
requirements
Critical events apply
infrequently to
SmallSats. Best
effort data
collection

Note that while elements such as radiation/radiation
hard parts and COTS parts qualification receive a lot of
attention, these elements of mission assurance are often
less cost effective than a multi-iteration development
cycle that emphasizes testing. This is because a
significant portion of small satellite hardware is
untested or un-vetted, including payloads. Our
experience has shown that a rapid development and test
architecture produces more successful results for this
class of spacecraft. Small satellites have a relatively
high infant mortality risk that can be mitigated by
rigorous testing to catch flaws prior to launch.
However, if there are technical risks identified for a
given design or mission, greater design assurance,
reliability engineering, parts planning, etc. may be
adopted to mitigate those risks. Robustness, i.e. the
removal of single point failures and/or redundancy, is
another way to mitigate risks. However this is difficult
given mass and volume constraints and the
complexities added to the system to handle increased
robustness often introduce their own problems. Adding
robustness through graceful degradation of systems is
generally more successful for small satellites.

The team and the wider organization see that the
mission is a low-cost, in-house, componentdemonstration experiment that is most likely to be
cheaper to test, fly and re-fly than to design-analyzetest-fly once, assuming launch windows-of-opportunity
(i.e. free to the mission program) are used. It would be a
relatively low-profile mission within the organization.
Therefore they accept a minimum mission success MA
profile where verification and validation is mostly
achieved through test rather than design and analysis.
USE CASE 2: Competing objectives/constraints
influencing the mission assurance posture.
A university team is looking to build their second
satellite. They have some practices and processes in
place based on success with the previous project, but
the team developing this particular satellite is mostly
new. Approximately 80% of the team will turnover
within two years. The number one priority of the
professor overseeing the team is student education of
system engineering fundamentals, but in an effort to
fund said education she has partnered with Company X
to fly their newest never-before-flown product and with
Launch Provider Y on their first flight of their rocket.
Company X wants to make sure this product has a
successful on-orbit demonstration, as it will increase
their ability to sell it to paying customers, but does not
have the resources to fully finance their own mission
and launch. Paying customers are not yet ready to take
a chance on this unproven technology for their mission.
Launch Provider Y believes in supporting the next
generation of students and is happy to help where
possible, but will not alter their schedule to
accommodate this mission if the university team’s
schedule slips.

Case Studies
USE CASE 1: Transitioning from requirement to
constraint driven assurance.
A new small satellite mission is conceived and expected
to depart from Class D assurance requirements in
several ways. Recognizing this, the team asks the
question “why?” They identify numerous constraints
such as allowable schedule, cost, available component
maturity, launch availability and team experience.
These constraints are then, in some cases, prioritized as
equal to or more driving to the implementation than the
science or technology mission objectives. Having
greater clarity on identified constraints, the team allows
the development and AI&T process to go forward in a
“best effort” mindset with the given resources available.

Use Case 2 is an example of the small satellite
community’s willingness to team, but also highlights
the mixture of skill sets (i.e. students to professionals),
expectations and constraints a combined team may face.
Figure 4 shows how this particular mission settled on
its assurance posture.

While one approach could have been to seek waivers
for Class D deviations, the team recognizes that given
the number of deviations for the mission, it is unclear at
what point the spirit and intent of Class D is lost and
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Figure 4: Use Case 2 negotiated mission assurance result
Each mission partner has different expectations of
acceptable outcomes and in the discussion of what
approach to take, schedule and educational constraints
were prioritized over traditional expectations of mission
success. With launch costs a non-trivial driver for both
the university and company, both were incentivized to
find a solution that would meet their constraints even if
it meant compromising on ideal outcomes. Had
Company X not been able to mitigate risk through
additional missions with other universities, they would
have had to make the choice of whether to have
confidence in the vehicle/assurance up to survival or
wait for a future opportunity more in-line with their
expectations at the cost of delayed product release. If
Company X decided not to proceed, the university
professor would have to decide whether educational or
technical de-scoping options were available to match
the funding available or seek alternate partnerships
which may risk the team’s ability to meet the Launch
Provider’s non-negotiable schedule. This use case
shows that by having the extended mission assurance
definitions, small satellite teams are able to articulate a
larger range of acceptable on-orbit performance driven
by prioritized constraints.

on-orbit performance considerations. A secondary goal
is to help investors assess the prospects of future
success. Phase 2 would field the final constellation and
include as-needed design, AI&T and mission operations
updates based on Phase 1 results. Time is of the essence
for Company X: other companies are considering
entering this market and investors want to see progress
towards a return on their investment. In Phase 1, both
investors and mission developers are willing to work
with imperfect functionality as long as a path to
planned functionality can be developed for Phase 2. In
this phase, the time constraint may have a high priority
and with future plans to put more satellites on-orbit,
Company X might choose a lower mission assurance
approach to realize near-term results and maintain
momentum. Perhaps achieving survival of the first set
of vehicles is sufficient to meet near-term goals. In
Phase 2, to save money and time, Company X may look
for a mixed mission assurance approach. They may ask
themselves questions 1 such as:
•

Can we spend a lot of time testing one space
vehicle prior to launch to rule out systematic
failures (i.e. Full Mission Success), but lessen

USE CASE 3: Constellation versus individual satellite
mission assurance.
1

The questions for fictional Use Case 3 are
inspired/adapted from Ref. 12. The authors of this paper
do not intend to imply that the authors of Ref. 12 have
knowledge of or agree with this approach.

Company X plans to field a constellation of satellites
and is working through two funding phases. Phase 1 is
a proof-of-concept demonstration for one satellite. The
primary goal of the demonstration is to help settle some
Jasper
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•

our testing requirements for the bulk of our
satellites (i.e. Survival or Minimum Mission
Success assurance profiles)?

from lessons learned across multiple small satellite
builders, and also include the University Nanosatellite
Program’s lessons learned.

Can we phase our constellation production and
launches such that we can improve later
designs if issues are discovered on orbit (i.e.
Full Mission Success assurance through onorbit testing/demonstration instead of purely
ground assurance practices)?

MAINTAIN SCOPE. Assuring mission success
starts with a well-defined scope that pays serious
attention to, and is bounded by, the capabilities of
the various small satellite form factors that can be
utilized. Generally accepting on-market capabilities
while only driving 1-2 aspects of the design often
greatly simplifies and adds mission assurance; again,
constraint driven and not requirement driven.

In these instances, each spacecraft would not
necessarily be tested at the same levels to achieve highcertainty with respect to mission assurance, but
solutions to achieving company goals within the
context of their identified and prioritized constraints
may still be possible.

DESIGN FOR TUMBLE. Every small satellite
tumbles at some point in its mission. Designing the
power system and communications system (near omnidirectional antenna pattern, baud rate scaling) to be
operational in the majority of potential tumble
orientations greatly increases survivability in offnominal cases.

USE CASE 4: Cost and schedule reduction by
decreasing external oversight.
The above use cases demonstrate the balance between
mission needs as well as technical and programmatic
constraints. One other major element of the taxonomy
from Table 1 is the ability to keep key decision points
closer to the mission implementers.

CREATE AND VERIFY WELL BEHAVED SAFE
MODE, RE-PROGRAMMABILITY. Safe mode
should be simple and power positive in the tumble state.
This safe mode should be well vetted and verified that it
does as intended. Flight software, and subsystem
software if possible, should be reprogrammable from
the ground since small satellites have categorically had
issues completing software validation and verification.
Further, re-programmability has saved multiple
spacecraft from being lost or not completing their
missions.

Program X wants to demonstrate a new satellite data
collection method given limited funding resources
within just two or three years of starting the program.
While good design practices are encouraged and high
confidence in mission success is desired, the available
funding and personnel availability for Program X is
minimal. In the end, the needs of Program X are to fund
mission(s) that provide the program the necessary data,
not to follow and guide the spacecraft development.

DESIGN FOR FULL POWER RESETS ON
HARDWARE. Since most small satellites accept
hardware that has little radiation performance
characterization, the simplest fix is to be able to reset
hardware, especially the flight computer. Full power
cycling must be possible without access to the flight
computer (i.e. through watchdog reset, the radio and/or
power system). Ideally, full power cycling (switching)
of the subsystems is possible from the ground.

Program X decides to develop the most risky elements
(e.g. the detectors) through a more rigorous prototype
development prior to building flight units; however, the
rest of the hardware is accepted as small satellite COTS
and does not undergo similar development. The
managers of Program X follow a mission assurance
profile of Full Mission Success for the detectors, but
only require a survival profile for the vehicle assuming
that previous design efforts have demonstrated adequate
likelihood of success. Further, the managers of Program
X only hold formal critical design reviews for the
detectors and vehicles and allow for internal vendor
practices on hardware development, thus reducing
significant development time and cost.

TESTING. It is imperative that ALL vehicles go
through significant testing, starting early in
development, because any incompatibilities and
improper assumptions made during design are
vetted by means of testing. Workmanship, design
flaws, and software mistakes are all found through a
rigorous testing campaign; these are the primary
problems seen in small satellite systems. It is
reasonable to dedicate about half of the overall schedule
to testing of hardware. (Even in the most aggressively
scheduled missions, about a third of the development
time has been in testing.) Outside of common
environmental testing and functional testing, SSP and
the University Nanosatellite Program require the

Best Practices
Mission assurance, for many institutions, incorporates
best practices into engineering efforts. While these are
not close to exhaustive, these lessons have been taken
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following four tests for all their vehicles, with a fifth
that is required for systems with attitude control. Note
these are referenced in Table 1 with the various test
numbers (1) to (5) in the Example Practices column.
1.

2.

3.

4.

Jasper

encompass any nominal commands as
expressed in the most current version of the
concept of operations document. Test
initialization should simulate launch vehicle
separation and run through commissioning and
checkouts of the spacecraft, then through a full
experiment plan for the mission. It should last
at least 24 hours.

Long Range Communications Test: verifies
that the spacecraft can communicate with the
ground station, at far field RF ranges. The
radio is assembled in the structure during the
test to account for the effects of the structure
and other components.

5.

Complete Charge-Discharge Cycle: includes
draining the battery to its depth of discharge
via spacecraft operations and then recharging
the battery through the spacecraft’s solar
panels and regulators. The test demonstrates
an autonomous recognition of when depth of
discharge of the battery has been reached. This
should be followed by an autonomous
transition to a safe/non-discharging mode. The
test should also demonstrate a charging of the
battery, autonomously recognizing when the
battery is fully charged, and autonomously
ceasing charging demonstrating Peak Power
Tracker/charging circuitry.

Sun Pointing Demonstration: includes
polarity/direction testing of all sensors and
actuators to ensure they are correctly
assembled and mapped in flight software. A 1D air bearing test is preferred to demonstrate,
but not quantify, that the vehicle correctly
tracks a bright light showing functionality of
the sun tracking determination and control.

CONCLUSIONS
What this paper describes and begins to propose is a set
of mission assurance profiles that expand the current
language of mission assurance. This new architecture
does not replace the old Class A-D as those are valid,
even for small satellites, for some types of missions.
Further, this new architecture is still to be defined and
the taxonomy presented is not a complete or final
representation. The approach is only proposed and has
not been approved by the Air Force. However, it is
proposed that:

Command Execution Test: executes every
command that will be sent to the spacecraft.
Ensures that the commands work and do not
put the spacecraft into any unknown error
states. All commands should be sent to the
spacecraft and an effort be made to observe the
spacecraft’s physical response to the command
(meaning not only the successful transmission,
but also execution). Depending upon MA
thoroughness not every permutation of a
command is tested, but every class of
command should be verified. Further, all
internal commanding of the flight computer to
subsystems should be demonstrated (e.g.
voltage and current thresholds on the power
system for different operations modes). These
should be tested in operational use cases if
configuration changes from system modes. In
some cases off nominal commanding should
be executed.
Day in the Life: includes spacecraft
initialization (i.e. spacecraft separation and
turn-on scenario), executing modes and
appropriate commands, as well as a turn-off
command from the ground. Not every ground
command needs to be executed in the DitL,
but the DitL should go through every
spacecraft mode and scenario. DitL should

•

New mission assurance profiles need to be
created that represent constraint driven
mission sets.

•

These new assurance profiles should heavily
weight constraints as being equal-to, or
greater-than, science or technology objectives.

•

At mission conception, a clear scope and broad
understanding of constraints help drive the
implemented MA profiles to practices that
have the greatest return-on-investment.

•

Constraint based MA is driven by the
technical,
programmatic
and
approval
authority/oversight environment. Generally
more constrained missions allow decisions in
all areas to be made closer to the project
implementers.

As a final remark, while outside the scope of this paper,
the small satellite community should consider if there is
a minimum bar for the implementation of mission
assurance, especially as space policies evolve to
encompass the small satellite expansion.
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Spaceflight Center GSFC-E-DAA-TN19806,
December
2014.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20150001352
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